SMOTHERED COVERED LLC V. WH CAPITAL LLC, (US DIST. CT., LOUISIANA, OCT. 2025)
CLAIMS: The plaintiff, Smothered Covered, LLC, sued over a commercial real estate deal involving a former Waffle House property in New Orleans. Smothered Covered claimed that WH Capital, the seller, breached the real estate sales agreement by removing key items from the building before closing, including light fixtures, stools, counters, booths, commercial sinks, and a kitchen exhaust hood. WH Capital characterized these items as removable “equipment” connected to Waffle House’s deidentification process and should be rightfully removed. Smothered Covered took a different view, claiming they were fixtures or component parts of the building and were included in the sale. In short, the buyer thought it was buying a second-generation restaurant, not a shell restaurant building with all the fixtures and equipment stripped out. Smothered Covered asserted claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and sought damages, lost profits, fees, and costs.
EVIDENCE: The property had operated as a Waffle House until 2020. The purchase agreement covered the real estate, including all improvements and fixtures, and defined fixtures to include “component parts”. Before closing, WH Capital told the buyer it would remove its “equipment,” but did not clearly disclose that this meant built-in restaurant features such as bolted stools, counters, booths, sinks, lighting, and the exhaust hood. After closing, Smothered Covered discovered that those items had been removed. WH Capital defended itself by pointing to the agreement’s “as is, where is” clause, the buyer’s inspection rights, and the argument that the removed items were not legally part of the building. It also argued that any damages should be measured by the property’s market value rather than restoration costs. Smothered Covered countered that the seller could not use “as is” language as a magic catch-all and strip a fully equipped restaurant into something materially different from what was promised.
COURT RULING: The court sided with Smothered Covered on the contract claim. It held that the removed items were component parts of the building and therefore part of the property that WH Capital agreed to sell. The court rejected WH Capital’s reliance on the “as is, where is” clause, explaining that such language may address defects in the property, but it does not permit a seller to remove part of the thing sold and then claim the buyer accepted it anyway. The court also rejected the argument that the buyer had to keep inspecting the property up to closing to prevent the seller from stripping it. Smothered Covered recovered $126,272 to replace the removed items and $41,023 to repair related damage. The court denied lost profits as too speculative and dismissed the fraud and unfair trade practices claims. It later denied WH Capital’s motion for reconsideration or new trial. Buyer wins.'
CHIASSON V. TAICLET, (CALIF. CT. APP., SEP. 2025)
CLAIMS: The plaintiff Bernard Chiasson sued his neighbor, Steven Taiclet, over the scope of a recorded easement across Taiclet’s property in Hayward, California. Chiasson owned a steep, unimproved parcel with no direct access to a public road. A 1999 recorded easement gave his property a 25-foot-wide by 94-foot-long strip across Taiclet’s land for “ingress and egress.” Chiasson wanted to develop that easement into a significantly planned fire-code-compliant roadway, which would require grading, filling, paving, curbs, and possibly retaining structures. Taiclet objected, arguing the easement permitted access but not a full-blown road construction project passing within a few feet of his house. Chiasson asserted claims including quiet title, declaratory relief, nuisance, encroachment, trespass, and injunctive relief. In practical terms, Chiasson claimed unlimited access rights, while Taiclet said yes, but not involving a highway through his side yard.
EVIDENCE: The easement’s history was messy. A prior owner once held broader rights that included roadway, pedestrian, animal, and utility access. In 1992, that owner quitclaimed the broader easement in exchange for a developer’s promise to provide a new right-of-way, utilities, a curb cut, grading, rock, and fencing. But the developer did not fully perform those promises, and therefore, after a boundary adjustment, the 1999 easement was revised with narrower language that basically allowed for only “ingress and egress,” and no express mention of utilities, grading, paving, or road construction. When Chiasson purchased his parcel in 2021, he later discovered the 1999 easement and sought to improve it into a roadway suitable for larger development. Evidence showed the easement passed within seven to eleven feet of Taiclet’s home. Experts disputed whether Chiasson’s proposed roadway could fit within the easement and whether it would materially burden Taiclet’s property. Chiasson also claimed Taiclet created a nuisance by obstructing the entrance, harassing workers, removing surveyor stakes, and removing retaining boards - essentially turning the easement into an obstacle course.
COURT RULING: After an eight-day trial, the trial court ruled that Chiasson could use the easement for vehicular access and could place rock or gravel to facilitate that use, but he could not grade, pave, or construct a fire-code-compliant roadway. The appellate court affirmed. It held that the 1999 easement had to be interpreted by its recorded language, not by the broader earlier exchange agreement. The phrase “ingress and egress” allowed access, including vehicular access, but did not authorize improvements that would materially alter the easement or impose an undue burden on Taiclet’s property. The court also affirmed dismissal of Chiasson’s nuisance claim, finding Taiclet’s conduct arose from a legitimate dispute over the easement’s scope and did not substantially interfere with any established access rights. Finally, the court upheld Taiclet as the prevailing party because Chiasson’s main objective—building the code-compliant roadway—was rejected, and therefore Taiclet was awarded attorney’s fees and costs.
VILLANUEVA V. VILL. OF VOLENTE, (U.S. DIST. CT. TEX., SEP. 2025)
LAIMS: Several homeowners challenged the Village of Volente, Texas’s regulation of short-term rentals (“STRs”). The plaintiffs owned homes in the small lakeside community and either operated or sought to operate them as STRs. They argued that Volente’s 2023 STR ordinance was so burdensome that it functioned as a de facto ban, violating federal and Texas constitutional protections. Their claims included federal and state due process/due course of law violations, equal protection violations, and, for one plaintiff, infringement of freedom of assembly based on limits on nighttime outdoor activity. In practical terms, the homeowners said the Village had turned STR approval into a neighbor-veto gauntlet, while the Village said it was simply trying to preserve peace, quiet, and harmony in the small lakeside town.
EVIDENCE: Volente has approximately 600 full-time residents and, over the years, adopted several ordinances regulating STRs in response to resident concerns. The 2023 ordinance required STR operators to obtain conditional use permits, notify nearby neighbors, participate in public hearings, and comply with complaint-based enforcement procedures. The record showed substantial neighborhood friction over STR activity, including complaints about noise, parking, septic odors, trespassing, traffic, trash, safety, and even a drone flying from one rental property onto a neighbor’s property. Two homeowner groups had their STR permit applications denied after bitterly advocated public hearings where residents complained about prior disturbances and compatibility with surrounding residential uses. Another plaintiff, Langer, received an STR permit but challenged restrictions on outdoor activities between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m., contending they limited her freedom of assembly. The Village argued that the ordinance was not a ban because other residents had received STR permits, and that it had legitimate land-use reasons to regulate the plaintiff’s STRs differently from ordinary long-term residential uses.
COURT RULING: The court granted summary judgment for the Village and denied the homeowners’ motion. It held that the 2023 ordinance was a lawful regulation, not an outright STR ban. The Village’s interest in protecting public health, safety, welfare, neighborhood character, and residential quiet outweighed any impairment. The court also held the ordinance was a valid zoning regulation and rationally related to legitimate government interests, defeating the due process and equal protection claims. The court rejected the argument that STRs must be treated exactly like long-term residential rentals, recognizing their quasi-residential, partly commercial nature. Finally, the court dismissed Langer’s freedom-of-assembly claim for lack of standing because the nighttime outdoor-activity restriction applied to STR guests, not her personal use of the property. The village town wins.
Written By: Sean Rieger | Attorney at Law
